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Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction in this matter is proper under both constitutional and
statutory provisions. Article VIII, Section 3 [Jurisdiction of Supreme
Court] states (in relevant part), "The Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction to issue all writs...." 1 And Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(1) reaffirms (in relevant part), "The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs...." 2 The proper filings
have been made with the Court in petitioning for extraordinary relief
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B and Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 19, the attendant fee has been waived per Petitioner's
Affidavit of Impecuniosity, all notice provisions have been complied with,
and by order of the Court this matter is now before it.
1 Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 3, as required, is included
in the Addendum (Appendix "C").
2

U.C.A. 78-2-2(1), as required, is included in the Addendum (Appendix
"C").

Statement of the Issues Raised
I n a mixed question of law and fact, did the Real Party in
Interest, on appeal de novo of a small claims action from a
justice court to district court, fail to timely pay a fee to the
justice court requisite under C.J.A. Rule 4 - 8 0 3 ( 2 ) ( D ) and Utah
Rule of Small Claims Procedure 12(b), and was the district court
thereby deprived of jurisdiction on appeal?
1

I n another mixed question of law and fact, w e r e equitable
considerations present which would give t h e district court discretion to disregard t h e aforesaid rules and assert jurisdiction?
I n a question of law, in light of t h e provision of U.C.A. § 7 8 - 6 1 0 ( 2 ) barring higher appeal of a small claims m a t t e r "unless the
[district] c o u r t rules o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f a statute o r
o r d i n a n c e " , can t h e foregoing questions be r e v i e w e d by t h e
U t a h Supreme Court via a petition for extraordinary relief, and
should any previous holdings of t h e Court allowing this be
reversed or modified, and if modified, to w h a t extent?
And as a state constitutional question raised attendant to the
last issue, in conditioning extraordinary relief by the Utah
Supreme Court to be contingent upon a showing of "abuse of
discretion" if it is to lie against a lower tribunal, does Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 65B(d)(2)(A) conflict with the "original jurisdiction"
provision of Article VIM, Section 3?

The Standard of Appellate Review with Supporting Authority
The Court's careful attention is bidden both to the Statement of
Jurisdiction above and to Appendix "A" of the Addendum.

This

reproduces a copy of a preface to a case report (Robinson v. City Court for

City ofOgden, 185 P.2d 256, 257 (Utah 1947)) and the commencement of
2

Justice Latimer's opinion therein, which respectively read,
"Original proceeding by James Robinson against the City Court for
the City of Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, and J. Quill Nebeker,
Judge thereof, to prohibit the judge from enforcing a certain judgment
holding the petitioner in contempt of court and sentencing him to a fine
or term in j a i l . "
and (per Justice Latimer), "Petitioner instituted original proceeding
in this court to prohibit defendant Judge of City Court of Ogden City,
Utah, from enforcing a certain judgment holding petitioner in contempt
of court and sentencing him to a fine or term in j a i l . " (Underlining and
emphasis added in both instances.)
It is respectfully submitted to the Court that this matter brought by the
present Petitioner is identically an original proceeding before it, similarly
seeking a writ of prohibition against a respondent judge. THEREFORE,
SINCE APPELLATE REVIEW IS NOT AT ISSUE HERE, there exists no
reguisite for this litigant to indicate a standard of review for any issue
raised herein NOR TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SUCH ISSUE WAS
PRESERVED IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
H O W E V E R , while conceding no necessity for doing so and solely in
a spirit of oh-well-what-the-heck, these considerations will be vouchsafed
in this brief.

To wit:

Presented in the Argument below are citations of the record
evincing that all issues w e r e explored at the trial level respecting
which the Court is now sought to prohibit the district court.
Therefore, to avoid redundancy they will not be repeated here.

3

Further, citing 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §703(a), "Conclusions of law
are reviewable, the appellate court not being bound by the conclusions of
law reached below, and such review is de novo"; and Betenson v. Call Auto
& Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982), "Where issue is
solely one of law, Supreme Court is as capable of determining the question
as trial court and is not bound by its conclusions"; I find authority for and
endorsement of this long-established legal precept I'm advocating, which
is moreover prettily enunciated in Jarmin v. Shriners' Hosps., 450 N.W.2d
750, 752 (N.D. 1990), "The trial court's conclusions of law are fully
reviewable and not subject to the clearly erroneous standard applicable to
questions of fact". Wherefore, asserting that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact (at least none that are crucial to a determination of
the issues), and conversely maintaining that all issues are concludable as
matters of law, I posit a de novo standard of review.
Additionally, quoting from paragraph 4, The 'Lectric Law Library's
Lexicon On Certiorari (http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c024.htm), wherein it is
stated, "By the common law a supreme court has power to review the
proceedings of all inferior tribunals and to pass upon their jurisdiction and
decisions on questions of law" (underlining and emphasis added), I would
rubricate the point that an issue of jurisdiction is before the Court, and by
its very nature such a determination is intrinsically a question of law and
stands apart from a review of the proceedings below.

4

Determinative Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
The following state constitutional provision, Utah Code Annotated
provision, Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule of Small Claims Procedure, and
Code of Judicial Administration Rule are determinative of the issues of
this case and their text is reproduced in full in Appendix "C" of the
Addendum:
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 3
Utah Code Annotated § 7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 1 )
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B
Utah Rule of Small Claims Procedure 12
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4 - 8 0 3

Statement of the Case
Effective Legal Writing for Law Students and Lawyers (4th ed. 1992)
by Gertrude Block denotes, in chap. 6.V Sections of the Brief, "The
purpose of the Statement of the Case is to show the appellate
court ...the procedural context in which the issues on appeal
arose...." And Legal Method and Writing (3rd ed. 1998) by Charles R.
Calleros, in chap. 19 The Brief—Effective Appellate Advocacy, explains,

"If the rules require you to state the procedural history in a
separate section, they typically designate the section as the
'Statement of the Case.'"
5

But Supreme Court Practice (8th ed. 2002) by Robert L. Stern et al.
advises, in chap. 13.9 Contents of the Statement of the Case, "How
detailed this summary should be w i l l vary with the individual
case.

A brief analysis may be sufficient when the opinion below

is analyzed or summarized at some length i n the Argument."
Insomuch as the first tripartition of the Argument infra is held by this
writer to adequately delineate the case procedurally up until the Court
was petitioned on April 7ib, 2003, to prohibit the district court from
asserting jurisdiction, the reader is referred thereto in this respect.

Statement of Relevant Facts
It is the particular nature of this case that most of the issues it brings
before the Court derive from questions surrounding the right to petition
for extraordinary relief and not from matters adjudicated below.

The

mixed question of law and fact as to whether the Defendant/Real Party in
Interest timely paid the requisite fee to the justice court for appeal de
novo to the district court is the primary exception to this. And events and
occurrences appertinent thereto are explicated in detail in the Argument.
It therefore mostly remains just to expound the circumstances of the
incident which gave rise to the small claims suit:
The action arose out of an automobile accident which occurred in
Tooele City, Tooele County, at approximately 50 N. Main Street circa 2:30
p.m. on October 1 6 ^ , 2002.

Defendant and Plaintiff were both headed
6

northbound in parallel lanes of a four-lane highway.

Defendant Castle

was in the innermost lane, and later testified that she was stopped behind
a van which was apparently making a U-turn.

As Plaintiff Panos drew up

behind her in the outermost lane, she pulled out around the van and
transitioned into his lane of travel. Plaintiff contends that she did so
abruptly and with too short of an interval between their vehicles to avoid
a collision.

Defendant maintains that she assumed the lane safely and

had traveled a reasonable distance therein when impacted.
No personal injuries were reported by the occupants of either vehicle.

The accident was investigated by a Tooele police officer, but his

write-up did not attribute blame to either driver.

Judgment was found for

the Plaintiff in justice court, and for the Defendant in district court.

Summary of Argument
Counsel for Defendant/Real Party in Interest Castle appealed for trial
de novo in district court from award of judgment to Plaintiff Panos in
justice court, but appeal fee due justice court was not paid during the 10day filing period allowed.

Utah Rule of Small Claims Procedure 12(b)

and C.J.A. Rule 4-803(2)(D) both require that this fee accompany the
Notice of Appeal, and the latter rule specifically provides that payment of
such is [quote] "necessary for conferring jurisdiction upon the district
court" [close quote]. A multo fortiori it is stare decisis under State v.
Johnson, 700 P.2d 1125,1128 (Utah 1985) that filing fees are jurisdictional if
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stated as a requirement per a plain language construing of the applicable
rules. (Also it is noted soto voce that the Notice of Appeal was defective
because it was not filed in the court issuing the judgment as required by
these same rules, but that is not at issue here.)
Adverse counsel have submitted an affidavit executed by their
secretary, declaring that she contacted an unnamed clerk of the justice
court who misrepresented the fees to her as being only the $70.^°- she
paid to the district court. Although no countervailing affidavits of the
justice court clerks have been lodged because they will not consent to
give them (don't want to get involved), they have all stated to this writer
that they were not so contacted.

It is irrelevant in any event, because

the clerks cannot provide legal advice, and the schedule of filing fees is a
statutory matter.
However, the trial judge disregarded all of the above authorities and
asserted jurisdiction anyway. As to the question of whether he had any
sort of discretion (equitable or otherwise) to do this, it is argued:
1.) It is impossible for a judge to exercise discretion over any matter
apart from having jurisdiction of the case in the first place, and,
2.) The Supreme Court cannot examine the guestion of whether the
court below correctly or incorrectly exercised discretion, because extraordinary relief proceedings invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court.
and it is stare decisis under State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034 at 1037 (Utah
8

1941) that the legal acceptation of an "original proceeding" is "to hear
[a] cause...uninfluenced or unconcerned or limited by any prior
determination, or the action of any other court juridically
determining the same controversy."
And finally, regarding what was posed to the litigants by the Court in
the third instance

in light of U.C.A. § 78-6-10(2), which reads, "THE de-

cision of the trial de novo may not be appealed unless the court

rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance"— can
extraordinary relief nevertheless lie in a small claims matter?:

Let it be

noted that "the decision" therein denotes the final judgment, and only
the final judgment, of the small claims action. And jurisprudence is
adduced to show that intermediary review is not to be assumed excluded
thereby.

Argument
I. The honorable Court has posed the issue:

"Whether the real party in interest, Jennifer
Ann Castle, failed to timely pay the filing fees
referenced by Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Ruie 4-803, and if so, whether that failure deprived
the district court of jurisdiction to entertain her
appeal de novo of the small claims judgment."
9

To commence with the latter part of the question first, I can conceive
of no reason why the referenced rule should not have the effect evident
from a plain reading of it. (Even if I could think of something, it would be
contrary to my own interest to so contend, so I'll just let the adverse party
vie on that point if they choose to or can.)
As to whether defendant Castle timely paid the filing fees, the
operative word there is "timely", because this plaintiff will concede that
finally, after a duration extending past the appeal period, all fees were
paid; it is a question of when.
Judgment for the plaintiff was entered in Tooele Justice Court on
February 7 ^ , 2003 in the amount of $2,465 (this is documented i n the
record at p. 3 6 ) , and the aforementioned rule provides in subparts (2)(A)
thereof:
"Either party may appeal a small claims judgment by
filing a notice of appeal in the court issuing
judgment

the

within ten days of the notice of entry of the

judgment/'
On February

2003, five calendar and three juridical days into the

allotted period, Defendant's counsel filed coram non judice (before the
wrong court), a written statement purporting to be a Notice of Appeal with
Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County by mail. A cover letter

accompanied this (found in the record at pp. 35 & 77). Much more
could be said about the defectiveness of this filing, but since the Court has

10

limited the issue on briefing to timeliness. I'll confine myself to that aspect.
This aforesaid cover letter— which was clearly directed to "Third
District C o u r t " — instructed, "Dear Clerk of the Court:
enclosed original: 1. (10TICE Of APPEAL

Please file the

Please also find enclosed our

check in the amount of $70.00 for the appeal." The district court clerk
accordingly credited the fee in that amount and docketed the case in that
court on February 13th. 2003, with pretrial conference scheduled for
March Z&.
The following day (February 14^, 2003), Plaintiff Panos having

received a copy of Defendant's Notice of Appeal in the previous day's
mail, Plaintiff immediately hand-delivered to Defendant's counsel a letter
which cautioned, "The purpose of this letter is ... to serve
appropriate notice on you that you should:... In particular I would
ask you to consider whether your appeal should be filed with
Third District Court in Tooele County/' At that point the time for
appeal still had (due to President's Day intervening) 10 calendar and 5
juridical days left to run. Receipt of this letter was acknowledged by
inscription of the signature of the firm's managing partner on a copy
thereof (a reproduction of which is in the record at p. 48).
Nevertheless, despite this clear warning. Defendant's counsel took no
heed to do anything about it until he received Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss
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Appeal on February 25^, 2003. The very next day thereafter, Defendant's counsel dispatched a $10^°- check and attendant letter (a reproduction of which is in the record at p. 68) to the Tooele Justice Court,
which read in relevant part, "Pursuant to our phone conuersation of this
morning, we have recognized that this office has inaduertently failed to send
the Justice Court the $10.00 filing fee required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-614(4). fls you are aware, this office has already supplied the $70.00 filing
fee required for de nouo with the District Court...."
The justice court accepted this proffered payment, but it clearly was
effectuated beyond the allotted time for appeal, and this is disallowed by
the following statute and rule:
"At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the appellant
must

deposit into court issuing the judgment the fees estab-

lished under Utah Code Ann. Section 21-1-5 [renumbered as
78-7-35] and Section 78-6-14."

(Utah Code of J u d i c i a l Administration Rule 4-803 (D))

"The appropriate fee must accompany the Notice of
Appeal." (Rule 12 o f t h e Utah R u l e s o f Small Claims Procedure)

Photocopies of these rules (found in the record at pp. 54 &
55) w e r e provided the trial court as exhibits to Plaintiffs
Motion to Dismiss, and their application argued in that
pleading (citing to record at p. 62.)
12

Nevertheless, despite the clear

import of these provisions, Judge Skanchy ruled at pretrial conference on
March 17&, 2003, that payment of the filing fee was not jurisdictional for
de novo appeal to the district court to lie. (Refer to Minutes of Pretrial Conference/Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal
at p. 133 of record; copy exhibited in Addendum, Appendix MD").
Thereafter a pleading entitled Motion for Reconsideration was
submitted to the trial court. The pleading was accepted and the motion
granted.

However, the court having reconsidered as prayed, its ruling

remained unchanged.

(Citing to Minutes of Trial De Novo at p. 154

of record; see Appendix "D".) But at p. 5 of this pleading (p. 144 of
the record) additional case law and argument were presented.

To wit:

"The Utah appellate courts have consistently used the
same

standard to determine 'whether the payment of

[statutory] filing fees, like the timely filing of a notice of
appeal, is jurisdictional and therefore necessary to perfect a
timely appeal.'

State

v. Johnson,

700 P.2d 1125, 1128 (start

of subdivision ll)(Utah 1985).

That standard is the plain language construing of the
applicable rule.
For example, in Prowswood,

Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply

Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984), the Supreme Court
'concluded that failure to pay the filing fee within the
requisite period is a defect of jurisdictional
Johnson [700 P.2d 1125] at 1128."
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magnitude.'

(Underlining added.)

The court below having been thus presented the law, it is
asserted that its ruling-—maintaining that, in the case then before
it, payment of the filing fee was not precondition^ to its having
jurisdiction— is plainly in error: and it had no power to entertain
the Defendant's small claims appeal de novo. But I warrant and
aver that the nature of this present Supreme Court proceeding
excludes that from being a factor in your determination of this
cause. I cite from the dissenting opinion of So-so Reverend Justice
Pratt in State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034 at 1044-1045 (Utah 1941):
"Mr. Justice LARSON rather emphatically draws the line
between appellate jurisdiction and original jurisdiction.

He

states: 'That jurisdiction which is not appellate is original.'
Thus they are mutually exclusive.

He continues: 'Appellate

jurisdiction is the jurisdiction to review the decision or
judgment of an inferior tribunal, upon the record made in
that tribunal, and to affirm, reverse or modify such decision,
judgment, or decree/

He continues later in his decision:

'Original jurisdiction as contradistinguished is the right to
hear the cause, to make its own determination of the issues
from the evidence as submitted directly by the witnesses; or
of the law as presented, uninfluenced or unconcerned or
limited by any prior determination, or the action of any other
court juridically determining the same controversy.

Original

jurisdiction as here used means the right of the court to
14

m a k e its o w n record, its own finding and d e t e r m i n a t i o n / "
(Underlining added.)

At this juncture I believe an admonitory caution should be stated
to the Court that, in relation to the above points, Defendant's counsel
has sought to obfuscate them in two ways:
First of all, with regard to the case of Gorostieta v. Parkinson. 2000 UT
99,17 P.3d 1110, Defendant's counsel has assayed to show the honorable
Court a horse and sell it a donkey. At p. 3 of adverse party's Answer to
Petition for Rehearing (filed with Utah Supreme Court on 7 / 3 0 / 0 3 ) ,
this blarney was proffered:

"Gorostieta is also analogous to the present matter for
reasons not addressed by Mr. Panos in his petition. In that
case, the clerk of the Court allowed the fees to be paid at a
later date."
Perhaps the easiest way to dispel this is just to recite from one of the
head notes of the case report:
"o. APPEAL AND ERROR. APPEAL BY GUARDIANS IN NEGLIGENCE

ACTION WAS TIMELY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE FILING FEES
WERE TIMELY PAID UPON THEIR BEING MAILED WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE DISTRICT COURT CLERK ON THE LAST DAY FOR FILING
THE APPEAL. WHERE THE CLERK ACCEPTED THE FAXED COPY OF THE
NOTICE OF APPEAL AS BEING TIMELY FILED." (Underlining added.)

15

And to quote from the Court's holding itself at p. 1115, U 18:
" T H E CLERK TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT SHE W O U L D ACCEPT T H E
NOTICE OF APPEAL BY FAX SO THAT T H E SECRETARY D I D N O T HAVE TO
TRAVEL FROM SALT LAKE CLTY TO LOGAN, AS LONG AS T H E ORIGINAL
NOTICE A N D FILING FEES WERE MAILED F O R T H W I T H / '

(Underlining added.)
If Defendant's counsel is able to discern correspondence between
that set of facts and his own tendering of the requisite fee and its receipt
by the Tooele Justice Court three days after the period for appeal had run
and more than two weeks after filing his notice of appeal, I am impressed
with his elasticity of mind.
The second bait-and-switch Defendant's counsel has endeavored to
foist upon the Court hinges on the fact that

like the Supreme Court and

Third District Court, Salt Lake Dept., at 450 S. State Street

Tooele

Justice Court and Third District Court, Tooele Dept, both share the same
address

47 S. Main Street, Tooele. So Defendant's counsel has sought

to promote the fallacy that the Notice of Appeal was merely miscaptioned
as for the District Court, but it was nevertheless sent TO the Justice Court
and not the District Court. (Or at least that's the notion he'd like you to
confusedly believe, trading upon the point that the mail of both of them is
delivered to the same location.)

Please note the convenient ambiguity

to be found at the aforementioned segment of the Answer to Petition for
Rehearing where it reads,

"In the present matter, as fully set forth in Ms. Castle's
16

Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Extraordinary
Writ, the clerk of the Tooele Court [which one?] was contacted
regarding the payment of fees."
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II. The honorable Court has posed the issue:

"Whether the district court had equitable
discretion to disregard the requirements of Rule 4803.

If so, what is the authority supporting such

equitable discretion."
I suppose, if this consideration had pertinence to the instant matter at
bar, that I could point out that the Utah Supreme Court recently
emphasized the importance of compliance with the Rules of Judicial
Administration in Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d
705. However, it don't make no never mind no how, so why bother?
matters not whether

the court below correctly

exercised

discretion, or didn't correctly exercise discretion.
irrelevant

to the nature

It

It is

of this proceeding.

As will be further developed in the subsequent argument hereafter,
this petition for extraordinary relief is brought pursuant to the honorable
Court's original jurisdiction and not its appellate jurisdiction.
17

I'm not the

least bit assured that the honorable Court has any grasp of the difference
between the two, so let me cite by way of explanation:
"'Original jurisdiction' as contradistinguished from 'appellate
jurisdiction' is the right to hear a cause and to make an original
determination of the issues from the evidence as submitted directly by
the witnesses, or of the law as presented, uninfluenced or limited by
any prior determination of any other court juridically determining the
same controversy." (Underlining added.)

Words and Phrases, 30 Original Jurisdiction 520 citing
State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1036, 1037, 100 Utah 316.
"'Original jurisdiction' as used in the constitutional provision...
means the right of the...court to make its own record, its own finding,
and its own original, independent determination not founded on one
previously made and not based upon or limited to the review of
another court's judgment or proceedings." (Underlining added.)

Words and Phrases, 30 Original Jurisdiction 520 citing
State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1036, 1037, 100 Utah 316.
"The 'jurisdiction' to consider causes...and to decide them on the
law and evidence according to the right of the case, independent of
the rulings and judgment of the lower court, is original and not
appellate." (Underlining added.)

In re Burnette, 85 P. 575, 577, 73 Kansas 609.
"'Jurisdiction' is the power to hear and determine, and ...the
power of an appellate court in dealing with the pleadings and the
evidence, in the application of the law and in the rendition of the
judgment according to the right of the case, all independent of the
action of the lower court. ...is not 'appellate jurisdiction' within the
meaning of laws creating jurisdiction." (Underlining added.)

Words and Phrases, 30 Original Jurisdiction 521 citing
State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1038, 100 Utah 316.
18

"Original jurisdiction as here used means the right of the court to
make its own record, its own finding and determination.

An original

determination is not one founded upon one previously made. It is
original in the sense that it stands alone upon its own base, not the
outgrowth of some other." (Underlining added.)

State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034,1037,100 Utah 316.
"Original jurisdiction as used in the constitutional provision means
an independent jurisdiction, one not based upon or limited to review
of another court's judgment or proceedings."

Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrig. Co., 9 Colo. 248, 250,11 P. 103.
"The right of the ...Court to hear and determine for itself, upon its
own record, any cause which is lawfully before the court cannot be
denied because the Constitution grants it the jurisdiction to make an
original determination."

State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034,1039, 100 Utah 316.
"Each hearing which starts from 'scratch' and permits the parties
to produce all available proper evidence on all of the issues is an
original hearing before the court. — o n e unfettered, unlimited, or
unconfined bv the hearing had before any other court or tribunal."
(Underlining added.)

State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1038, 100 Utah 316.
The honorable Court's attention is called especially to the stipulation
of the last citation above, and further to the fact that the present cause
before it is an original proceeding. And hence these additional citations
are moreover presented for the Court's elucidation:
"A proceeding in superior court to review a decision of state tax
commission denying taxpayer a refund of income taxes, as authorized
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by statute, is an 'original proceeding' rather than an 'appeal'...."
State ex rel O'Neill v. Hall, 110 P.2d 960, 963, 57 Ariz. 63
"Action challenging findings of fact, conclusions of law or order of
Public Utility Commission was not 'original proceeding' or 'original action,' but was an appeal...."

US West Communications, Inc. v. Eacbus, 862 P.2d 102,
124 Or.App. 325.—Pub Ut 189.
Now look, I don't object if, either out of idle curiosity or for whatever
dubious insight you think it may provide you in making your own
independent determination, you wish to understand what was in the
Reverend Mr. Skanchy's mind (if indeed anything at all) when he
disregarded C J.A. Rule 4-803.

Fine, bemuse yourselves with that if you

wish. But if that indicates a disposition to subvert this original
proceeding by transmuting it into an appeal where you accord him
deference under some sort of review for abuse of discretion, then the
Court is off the reservation.
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However, lest I seem petulant to the Court, or combative with it, let
me provide argument on the point you have raised:
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR A JUDGE TO EXERCISE DISCRETION
(equitable or otherwise) IN ANY MATTER IN A CASE IF HE HASN'T FIRST
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OF ALL GOT JURISDICTION OVER IT. (It's sort of like saying "Always
respect niggers"

the proposition is inherently flawed.)

Before a judge

is vested with authority to waive the application of any of the Rules of
Judicial Administration in regard to any aspect of a case, it must be
preceded by him having acquired jurisdiction of the case. And if that is
controlled by those very same rules, so be it.

I am well aware that in

Scott v. Majors, 1999 U T App 139,112, 980 P.2d 214, this court stated that
the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration "are not intended to, nor do
they create or modify substantive rights of litigants, nor do they decrease
the inherent power of the court to control matters pending before it."
(Under-lining added.)
"pending before it".

But the operative phrase in that statement is
No matter in a case is pending before a judge apart

from
jurisdiction, and Rule 4-803 determines when a court has jurisdiction.
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RAISED

I am prepared to deal more fully (contingent upon what emerges in
the adverse party's brief) with the non sequitur presented by a judge
"exercising discretion" to acquire jurisdiction of a case, but for the
moment I must move on to another non sequitur, that of the conflict of
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 65B(d)(2) with Article VIII. Section 3 of
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*ff*

the Constitution of Utah:
Rule 65B(d)(2) directs that "appropriate [extraordinary] relief may be
granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion" (underlining added). But Const, art. 8, § 3 specifies "The
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs" (underlining added). SO WHERE'S THE CONFLICT?

Well, let's

see if two more citations will enable you kids to see it for yourself:
"It will at once be noted that original jurisdiction is used here in
contradistinction to appellate jurisdiction.
is not appellate is original.

That jurisdiction which

Appellate jurisdiction is the jurisdiction

to review the decision or judgment of an inferior tribunal, upon the
record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, reverse or modify such
decision; judgment, or decree."

State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1037, 100 Utah 316.
"'Appellate' pertains to the judicial review of adjudications.
'Appellate jurisdiction' is the power to take cognizance of and review
proceedings had in an inferior court...."

Ex parte Henderson, 6 Fla. 279.
DON'T YOU GET IT? RULE 65B(d)(2) AND CONST. ART. 8, § 3 CANNOT
COINCIDE!

If in determining whether to grant extraordinary relief the

Court looks to see if an inferior court abused its discretion, it is exercising
appellate jurisdiction and is not proceeding under art. 8, § 3.
Despairing that the penny might not have dropped down the slot with
the honorable Court even now, I close with a brief restatement of the
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argument yet again, starting with the gloss of "original jurisdiction" in
Black's Law Dictionary for illustrative contrast and counterpoint:
"originaljurisdiction. A court's power to hear and decide a
matter before any other court can review the matter.
Cf. appellate

jurisdiction."

Yeah, yeah, ask any juridical incompetent (which is virtually anybody
with a state Bar no. after their name) what "original jurisdiction" means,
and that's probably how they'll denote it. BUT THAT IS BY NO MEANS
THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE TERM TO BE HAD PER THE MAXIM OF
STARE DECISIS UNDER UTAH LAW. I conclude by invoking the Very
Most Reverend Justice Wolfe:
historical aside: When reading Utah Supreme Court holdings as a
diversion, I like to return back half a century or so. Seems like
then, if the bench divided over issues, they didn't just differ, they
nearly derided one another in their opinions. And none was more
two-fisted than Justice Wolfe. Always one to have his own say,
whether concurring or dissenting, you could pretty much count on
Justice Wolfe to voice himself separately. For him to have
endorsed this notion as emphatically as he did, he must have found
something which really recommended it.

"I concur. The opinion very clearly develops the thesis
that "original jurisdiction" as used in the Constitution does
not mean that an action must be brought in the court having
original jurisdiction, nor that there is a right originally to
initiate it in that court. The word "original" expresses an
adjudicative power of the court to function originally in
regard to that litigation, independently of another tribunal,
as it could have done if originally brought in that court and
23

not as a court reviewing the action of another tribunal.

I

think the distinction sound and the only one workable under
the various provisions of our constitution." (Underlining
added.)

State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1044, 100 Utah 316.
But cross-check again that sage reckoning with the stipulation of
Rule 65B(d)(2) that "appropriate [extraordinary] relief may be granted: (A)
where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising
judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion"
(underlining added). Justice Wolfe is surely turning over in his grave.
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3. The recourse to the principles of justice to

correct or supplement the law as applied to particular
circumstances, [as in], "The judge decided the case by equity
because the statute did not fully address the issue."
[Or as in], "In appealing to the equity of the court, she was
appealing to the 'king's conscience'."
Black's Law Dictionary

As a third response to the Court's briefing issue as rehearsed at the
beginning of this section of argument, it must be noted that the question
of whether the district court had discretion to disregard C.J.A. Rule 4-803
carried the qualification "equitable" discretion. Arguendo, let's say it
did have such discretion as a matter of equity. Then what
facts of the case would require that such equity be
24

exercised?

I know of none.

The only possible thing I can think of in this regard is the assertion by
Janet Layosa, the secretary of the counsel to the adverse party, that in
filing de novo appeal from justice court to the district court, one of the
justice court clerks allegedly informed her that the fee due was only
$70.°-°-. Well, to begin with. I have queried all of the justice court clerks.
and none of them has any recollection of ever so advising her.
I therefore did previously make a motion to the Court to have
Ms. Layosa's affidavit asserting this (found at pp. 7 9 , 8 0 , 3 2 2 & 3 2 3 of
record) struck as sham, and adverse counsel objected to this because
my motion wasn't supported by countervailing affidavit.

I would have

presented my own affidavit to this effect, but I didn't want the contention
to be one of "I say that the justice court clerks said to me...". I wanted
them to speak for themselves.

But when I tried to get affidavits from the

clerks, none of them wanted to get involved. I asked Judge Pitt of the
justice court to prevail on them to do this, and he said the Supreme Court
had investigators (he really said that) to determine such facts as needed.
But arguendo again, let's suppose the adverse counsel's secretary
really did call the justice court, and someone there really did tell her the
only fee due was $70.^°- to the district court.

difference does it make?

What the hell

Court personnel cannot

dispense legal advice.
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At p. 5 of adverse counsel's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion to Dismiss Appeal (p. 84 of record), it is proclaimed, "It should

be noted that the [Utah] Supreme Court noted in Dipoma that a party
should be able to rely on the statement of Court clerks. See id. [Dipoma v.
McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225 (2001)] at 1229." And this was rehearsed before this
Court at p. 7 of adverse counsel's Memorandum in Opposition to
Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Writ (p. 331 of record), where it
was again ballyhooed, "This Court noted in Dipoma that a party should be
able to rely on the statement of Court clerks.

See id. at 1229. In the

present matter, Counsel's secretary called the clerk to verifythe [sic] amount
due and reasonably relied and in fact acted on that advice." And much,
much, much has been made of that by adverse counsel, who has

greatly trafficked upon it. Well, if you go to the actual reference, it
speaks of "reasonable reliance by parties on a [court clerk's]
acceptance of a pleading."

It is very important that we understand

what is in view in that holding of the Court, and that w e be able
to

distinguish

in

reference

made

apart

between
to

the

statements

duties

of

their

made

by

office,

clerks
and

ones

therefrom.

Let's say I am in Nephi and have until Friday to file a Petition for
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Rehearing with the Utah Supreme Court.

And at 9 a.m. on the morning

it's due, I call Pat Bartholomew and say, "Pat, I mailed that to you the
day before yesterday.

Please check and make sure you got it.

Otherwise I'll have to drive up there with another copy and file it in
person."

Then she comes back on the line and assures me, "Don't

worry; it's here.

It's been stamped and filed."

Well, it's a duty of her

office to know what's on file with the Court, and what's not on file. I
can't go to a volume of the Utah Code Annotated and determine that for
myself.

It's not recorded in a statute somewhere.

The only people

who'd be able to tell that are court personnel. And I must rely on what
they inform me.
So if it turns out later that I was misled by Pat Bartholomew about
that, Chief Justice Durham can't simply say to me, "I guess it's just hard
cheese for you, Mr. Panos. The time for filing a Petition for Rehearing is
past, and I can't do anything about it."

No, if Pat Bartholomew admits

she wrongly advised me in that regard, it's the Court's fault, and, for the
sake of equity, I should be allowed to file late.
H o w e v e r , let's suppose the Court were to have denied my original
imploration for extraordinary relief.

And I rang up Pat and inquired,

"Gee, can't I get any further review or reconsideration in this matter?"
And she rejoined, "Uh uh, that's it. There's no provision for any
supplemental action."

If, three months down the line, some lawyer tells

me I could have asked for rehearing under Appellate Procedure Rule 35,
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I can't go down to the Matheson Courthouse and rage and fulminate to
Chief Justice Durham, "Your sh**-for-brains clerk doesn't know her job!
She completely misguided me as to the allowance made by Rule 35."
Chief Justice Durham wouldn't be fit for her post if she didn't retort,
"You can inquire points of law of my clerk as you will and she can advise
on them as she wishes, but the risk of misdirection is solely yours. It is
not a function of her office to provide such instruction. The court staff do
not exist for the purpose of leading the public through the legal process.
Questions of rehearing rights [and filing fees due] are matters of statute,
and, pro se or not, you are expected to know them yourself, without
regard or resort to anything my clerk may tell you. BUT if she warranted
to you that something was filed when it was not, that's a horse of another
color, because you are entitled to rely on her in such respects."
And by the way, Janet Layosa doesn't work in a nail salon; her bosses
are three attorneys. So if she had some question about the statutory
schedule of filing fees, why didn't she just ask one of them instead of
calling (if indeed she ever did) some little peon in the Tooele Justice
Court? Or does that reflection provide some sort of profound insight and
commentary on the professional capabilities of Paul H. Matthews &
Associates, P.C.?

(Like they wouldn't know how to look it up.)

III. The honorable Court has posed the issue:

"Whether, notwithstanding the requirements of
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section 78-6-10(2), which bars further appeal
'unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance,' an extraordinary writ may
nonetheless provide a further avenue of relief.

If

so, whether, and what, limits should be placed on
the scope of the relief.

If not, should this court

reconsider or modify its holding in Kawamoto v.
Fratto. 994 p.2d 187 (Utah 2000), which permitted
such relief."
In commencing my apology on this point, I would like to reinvite
attention to the case of State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1941), in
which the Court was asked to resolve the question of whether the
constitutional provision of art. 8, § 7, vesting "original jurisdiction" in the
district courts over specified classes of cases, should be construed as
requiring that such cases be instituted in initio in the district courts rather
than justice courts. The Utah Supreme Court most emphatically held that
NO, such was NOT the proper interpretation, and esteeming its holding in
that case to be very cogent and perspicacious, I hereafter cite it frequent-

ly.

To wit (AND THIS IS PERHAPS THE MOST

CRUCIAL CITATION IN THIS BRIEF):
"[W]hat is the meaning of the term original

jurisdiction?

DOES IT REFER TO THE LOCUS OR SITUS OF THE
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INITIAL INSTIGATION OF A LEGAL CONTROVERSY, fir
does = it refer to the nature of the adjudicative power of
the tribunal?

DOES IT REFER TO THE TRIBUNAL

WHERE THE PROCESSES INVOKING JUDICIAL ACTION
MUST EMANATE OR BE FILED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE,
or does it define the form and extent of the juridical
power?

We have

no hesitancy

in saying

it is the

latter."

(Italics, emphatic capitalization, and underlining added.)
State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1036, 100 Utah 316.
Now you present bunch who sit in the seat of Moses, arrayed up there
on the top floor of the Matheson Courthouse like five blackbirds perched
on a telephone wire, consider a concern long and hard that those who
wore those court robes before you once carefully regarded, ones perhaps
more worthy than yourselves, and ponder well what Justice Larson went
on to pen writing for the majority:
"Article VIII [of the Constitution of Utah] vests the whole
judicial power of the government in the courts therein
enumerated.
jurisdiction
appellate

The Supreme Court is given

original

as to certain specified writs, and in other cases
jurisdiction

only." (Underlining added.) Idem

Now just to be sure you've got that apprehension fixed in your minds
with absolute certainty, let me hammer on it further:
Constitutionally you have been afforded just two types of authority
which you may exercise:
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1.) Original jurisdiction over all extraordinary writs and questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States, and,
2.) Appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as
provided by statute. (That's it, kids, that's all she wrote.)
Now just to be sure you understand that last part about "to be
exercised as provided by statute", let me retranslate that for you: it
means the Utah State Legislature can by statute abridge your appellate
jurisdiction to whatever extent it deems fit. THINK NOT?

(I'm reminded

of that classic line in the Katherine Anne Porter novel Ship of Fools
where the Jew is asked why he doesn't take the Nazis seriously, and he
guffaws and responds, "My friend there are over 3 million Jews in
Germany alone.

What are they going to do, kill us all?)

Well, let's take small claims actions as an example.

The state

legislators have decreed by statutory fiat (remember, it was you who
quoted the title, chapter, and section to me in your outline of briefing
issues) that you shall have no appellate jurisdiction over such cases; so
by the white Christ, you have no appellate jurisdiction over small claims
actions. And you guys are so pleased with that you want to divest yourselves even further and not even be able to exercise original jurisdiction
by extraordinary writ over them either.
idea.

Oh yeah, that's a real smart

(If Justice Panos were on the bench, I'd approach that proposition

will all the tentativeness of an agnostic's prayer: "O God if there is one,
save my soul if I have one.")
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But like it or lump it, I didn't invoke the honorable Court's appellate
jurisdiction. I invoked your original jurisdiction. And you have the discretion to grant or deny me the relief I petitioned you for, but constitutionally
you cannot circumscribe me from invoking that jurisdiction, and if yet the
Court does, it incurs harm to itself.
Is there some silly statute which says small claims actions aren't
appealable?

So what!

the instant case?

Who cares!

What relevance does that have to

The question presented by the matter at bar before

you sure as **** don't involve no ******* appellate review.

| n proof of this,

having already cited sustaining authorities nearly ad infinitum in previous
argument, I now invoke yet four more as follows:

Marbury v. Madison? You gotta be kiddin' me! (Yeah, I
bet you thought you'd never live to see it, Marbury
v. Madison actually being cited in a brief; but here's
the man himself, Chief Justice Marshall. (And who,
listening to the CNN coverage of the war in Iraq,
hasn't heard the phrase "Marshall law"?):
"When an instrument...define[s] the jurisdiction of the
supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall take
original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate
jurisdiction; the plain import of the words seems to be, that
in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original and not
appellate: in the other it is appellate, and not original.... It is
the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises
and corrects the proceedings

in a cause already
32

instituted,

and does not create that cause."

(Italics and underlining added.)

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,175, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60.
"To issue a writ of mandamus to an officer for the delivery
of a paper is in effect the same as to sustain an original action
for the paper, and belongs to "original jurisdiction and not to
appellate jurisdiction."
Marbury v. Madison, Dist.Col., 5 O.S. 137,1 Cranch 137,
2 L.Ed. 60.
"A mandamus to an officer is held to be the exercise of
original jurisdiction; but a mandamus to an inferior court of
the United States, is in the nature of appellate jurisdiction."
Ex parte Crane, 1831, 5 Peters (30 U.S.) 190,193, 8 L.Ed. 92.
" [ E s t a b l i s h e d pursuant to executive instructions for the
government of the armies , to try military offenses 'under the
c o m m o n law of war' [during the Civil Warl...the commission
did not exercise such 'judicial' power that review would be an
exercise of appellate, rather than original, jurisdiction.

The

opinion concludes with the observation that 'there is no
original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to issue a writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to review or reverse its proceedings, or the writ of certiorari to revise the proceedings of
a military commission'." (Underlining added.)
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure:
Jurisdiction 2d. § 4005, p. 101 n. 15—citing Ex parte Vallandigham,
1863, 1 Wall. (68 U.S.) 243, 253,17 L.Ed. 589.
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In summation then, having wearied myself on this point to where
further words and citations fail me, I recapitulate it briefly once again:
The action I have commenced before this honorable Court is an original
proceeding, original proceeding, original proceeding. It ain't no appeal,
ain't no appeal, ain't no appeal, and I begrudge the honorable Court any
attempt to reinvent, recast, or redefine it that way appertaining to some
damned inapplicable statute.
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Now here's a little I.Q. test to see if any of you Gang of Five
operating down there on State Street have enough brains to give you
back pressure to blow your noses with. Do you have any idea how your
contrasting constitutional predication puts you in the catbird seat
juxtaposed to your accessories the Gang of Nine? They don't have the
organic power you have!
Compare:
All excerpts and case citations derived from Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d §§ 4005,4015, and 4016. (All underlining and italics
added.)
"Statutory authority to issue extraordinary writs [was
combined into All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651, in the 1948
codification of the Judicial Code and] is limited by the
constitutional constraints of Article III....More distinctive limits
derive from the difference between the Supreme Court's original
and appellate jurisdictions. § 4005, p. 99
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"Cases frequently arose in the state courts that combined
issues reviewable by appeal with other issues that were
reviewable only by certiorari....but it became settled that the
certiorari issues could be presented in the appeal papers without
filing a separate petition. § 4016, p. 265
T h e nonappealable issue is treated...as if contained in a petition
for a writ of certiorari, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2103....'

Mishkin v. New York , 1966, 86 S.Ct. 958, 965, 383 U.S. 502,
512, 16 L.Ed.2d 56.
"[0]nce an appeal was properly taken, the appellant had a
right to argue all federal questions in the case, including issues
that standing alone could be raised only by petition for
certiorari. § 4016, p. 265
f

ln finding that we have appellate jurisdiction, we also take

jurisdiction over any aspects of the cases which would otherwise fall
within our certiorari jurisdiction/ (Underlining added.)

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 1975, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1042
n. 14, 43 L.Ed.2d 328.
"In an uncertain number of cases, the Supreme Court refused
to decide state court appeals properly within its jurisdiction....So
long as the statutory distinction between appeal and certiorari
existed, these cases provided a critical test of the traditional
understanding that appeal jurisdiction provided review as a
matter of right, while certiorari jurisdiction provided review as a
matter of discretion....Cases that did not involve the validity of a
state or federal statute or treaty were relegated to discretionary
review by certiorari, no matter h o w important the individual
rights that might be involved. § 4015, pp. 250 & 261
In Southern & Northern Overlying Carrier Chapters v.
Public Utils. Commn., 1977, 98 S.Ct. 251, 434 U.S. 9, 54 L.Ed.2d 8,
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Justice Rehnquist dissented, urging that the statutory distinction
between certiorari and appeal jurisdiction required adjudication on
the merits...

§4015, p. 253 n. 12

"There is no clear support in legislative history for the
argument that in distinguishing between appeal and certiorari,
Congress intended to exclude all discretionary doctrines from
the disposition of appeal cases....There is little to be gained in
abstract debate about the inherent nature of an appeal, or about
the power of Congress to regulate the Court's jurisdiction
by
denying discretion if it chooses, § 4015, p. 261
"The All Writs Act [28 U.S.C.A. § 1651] authorizes the
Supreme Court and all Courts established by Act of Congress to
[subpart (a)] issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.

The limits of this open-ended authority have never been
precisely defined. § 4005, p. 97
It has been observed that the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction is
'dependent upon a statute which is vague in terms and by reference
incorporates the common law,' and that this vagueness is supplemented by the fact that 'with regard to the extraordinary writs, avoidance of technical, indeed even of non-technical, questions has always
been a policy of the Court.'

citing Wolfson, Extraordinary Writs in the

Supreme Court Since Ex Parte Peru, 1951, 51 Co.L.Rev. 977, 989.
§ 4005, p. 97 n. 2
The power of this Court to issue writs of prohibition never has
been clearly defined by statute or by decisions.' Ex parte Bakelite
Corp., 1929, 49 S.Ct. 411, 412, 279 U.S. 438, 448, 73 L.Ed. 789.
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"Clearly Congress has power to limit appellate writ jurisdiction, just as any other branch of appellate
jurisdiction.
§ 4005, p. 103
As Judge Friendly noted, '[W]e find it hard to believe, in the
absence of better evidence than the Reviser's Note [All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1651 / 1948 codification of Judicial Code], that Congress
meant to curtail a power the Supreme Court had possessed for 159
years.'

US. v. Weinstein, C.A.2d, 1971, 452 F.2d 704, 711,
certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1766, 406 U.S. 917, 32 L.Ed. 873.

§ 4005, p. 104 n. 25
It was further concluded [in Ex parte Yerger*, 1868, 8 Wall. (75
U.S.) 85 at 103, 19 L.Ed. 332] that the act of 1868 1 , 'passed under
such circumstances' as it was, should not be taken to remove the
appellate power the Court had enjoyed from the beginning without
2
resort to the act of 1867 . (Notations added.) § 4 0 0 5 , p. 101 n. 13
An Act to Amend an Act Entitled "An Act to Amend the Judiciary Act, Passed the Twenty-Fourth of September, Seventeen Hundred
and Eighty-Nine," ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44 (1869).
2
An Act to Amend "An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the
United States," Approved September Twenty-Fourth, Seventeen
Hundred and Eighty-Nine, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385-387 (1868).
*ln regard to Ex parte Yerger supra, text from that holding of
the Court is highly conducive of the intellection at hand:
"[W]e must determine the true meaning of the Constitution and the law in
respect to the appellate jurisdiction of this court We are not at liberty to
except from it any cases not plainly excepted by law; and we think it sufficiently
appears from what has been said that no exception to this jurisdiction embraces
such a case as that now before the court. On the contrary, the case is one of
those expressly declared not to be excepted from the general grant of jurisdic37

tion....
"It is proper to add, that we are not aware of anything in any act of
Congress, except the act of 1868, which indicates any intention to withhold
appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases [and please take note, boys,
how that contrasts with original jurisdiction in habeas corpus
cases] from this court, or to abridge the jurisdiction derived from the
Constitution and defined by the act of 1789.

We agree that it is given subject

to exception and regulation by Congress; but it is too plain for argument that
the denial to this court of appellate jurisdiction in this class of cases must.,
seriously hinder the establishment of that uniformity in deciding upon questions
of personal rights which can only be attained through appellate jurisdiction,
exercised upon the decisions of courts of original jurisdiction.
"These considerations forbid any construction giving to doubtful words the
effect of withholding or abridging this jurisdiction. They would strongly
persuade against the denial of the jurisdiction even were the reasons for
affirming it less cogent that they are....We are obliged to hold, therefore,
that...this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may, by the writ of
habeas corpus, aided by the writ of certiorari, revise the decision of the Circuit
Court....This conclusion brings us to the inquiry whether the 2d section of the
act of March 27th, 1868, takes away or affects the appellate jurisdiction of this
court under the Constitution and the acts of Congress prior to 1867.
In McCardle's case [Ex Parte Mcdrdle,

74 U.S. 5 0 6 (Wall.) ( 1 8 6 8 ) ] ,

...the argument having been concluded on the 9th of March, 186°> was taken
under advisement by the court. While the cause was thus held, and before the
court had time to consider the decision proper to be made, the repealing act
under consideration was introduced into Congress. It was carried through both
houses, sent to the President, returned with his objections, repassed by the
constitutional majority in each house, and became a law on the 27th of March,

38

within eighteen days after the conclusion of the argument The effect of the act
was to oust the court of its jurisdiction of the particular case then before it on
appeal, and it is not to be doubted that such was the effect intended. Nor will
it be questioned that legislation of this character is unusual and hardly to be
lustifled except upon some imperious public exigency. It was, doubtless, within
the constitutional discretion of Congress to determine whether such an exigency
existed; but it is not to be presumed that an act, passed under such
circumstances, was intended to have any further effect than that plainly
apparent from its terms."
God d a m n , I sure hope you're g e t t i n g this, and t h a t it
giues you t r e p i d

pause.

"The limitation of extraordinary writ review to appellate
u s e s presents few practical problems today. § 4 0 0 5 , p. 101
A writ of mandamus issued...'in a case already instituted in the
courts...is deemed a part of the appellate jurisdiction of this court,
which is subject to such regulations as the Congress shall make.'
In re Winn, 1909, 29 S.Ct. 515, 517, 213 U.S. 458, 465-466,
53 L.Ed. 873 (per Moody, J.) § 4 0 0 5 , p. 103 n. 21
"[A]nd if ever there should be a case actually demanding
p r o m p t Supreme Court action, it can b e secured by initial
application to a lower court and virtually simultaneous
application to the Supreme Court.
problems

generally

have no present

The intricate
practical

theoretical
importance."

§ 4005, p. 102
Oh yeah, there's words of reassurance.

LUe don't

haue to worry about partisan spirits on the Senate
Judiciary Committee conspiring to use euen
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iust mere

rules of order to obstruct the filling of federal
judgeships and whatnot.

Arcane

constitutional

considerations surelg aren't much of a concern.

Now listen up, here's the second most crucial
citation in the whole brief:
"Chief Justice Fuller provided the leading statement of
congressional control in the extraordinary writ context in U.S. v.
Dickinson, 1909, 29 S.Ct. 485, 487-488, 213 U.S. 92, 100-101, 53 L.Ed. 711....
[T]he Court went on to reject an alternative claim that the All
Writs Act authorized review by certiorari. The opinion relied on
the rule that congressional definition of the Court's appellate
jurisdiction precludes any exercise of jurisdiction not defined by
Congress, and found it 'quite inadmissible' to draw from the All
Writs Act a jurisdiction precluded by construction of the more
specific statutes." § 4005, p. 99 n. 23
Do you understand what's going on there? One set of congressional
enactments establishes the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate authority, and
another set of congressional enactments establishes its extraordinary writ
authority. NOW THEORETICALLY, because certiorari is an extraordinary
writ just like the other extraordinary writs of habeas corpus, scire facias,
injunction, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, etc., then if Congress
clearly intended to deny the Supreme Court review of such and such
cases under one statutory authority, maybe the Court could still get away
with issuing a writ of certiorari under the other. Well, what Justice Fuller
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is pointing out in the last citation above is that that would be like a father
telling his son, "I'll give you money for food, if you'll promise me you
won't spend it on beer." And the boy promises, spends the money on
food, and then trades the food for beer.

It might be argued that that was

never technically disallowed by the father, or the extraordinary writ of
certiorari in such postulated cases never technically disallowed the
Supreme Court by Congress. But Justice Fuller is herewith promising
that the Supreme Court would never resort to such a thin device in regard
to certiorari and the legislative edict which equips them to issue the writ.
Well, you Utah bunch who have adopted black as your gang colors
are now proposing to cheerfully self-inhibit yourselves where the framers
of the Utah Constitution did not. "Has the state legislature decreed by
pronunciamento that our appellate authority doesn't extend to small
claims matters?

Well then, it wouldn't be gentlemanly to use our

constitutionally unlimited extraordinary writ power to review such cases
either, would it?"

The United States Supreme Court may be forced to lie

on that Procrustes' bed, but you want to throw yourselves down on it. In
doing so you'll be reduced to five mere catamites (small boys used for
immoral purposes) existing only to cater to and indulge the state
legislature.
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It is intriguing to note that the statute under scrutiny, U.C.A. § 78-6-

10(2), reads, "THE decision of the trial de novo may not be
appealed unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a
Statute or ordinance", rather than, " A d e c i s i o n . . . / '

(Underlining

and emphatic capitalization added.) And the construction most
obtaining would be that this refers to the FINAL JUDGMENT of the case:
"The court's decision of a case is its judgment thereon. The
Judicial Code uses 'decision' as the equivalent of 'judgment' and
'decree.'

Sections 1281, 238 2 " (Notations added.)

U.S.—Rogers v. Hill, N.Y., 53 S.Ct. 731 at 734, 289 U.S. 582, 587,
77 L.Ed. 1385, 88 A.L.R. 744 (1933).
1

Judicial Code (of 1911) §128 = 28 USC §225 (1946)
= 28 USC §§1291-1295 (current)

2

Judicial Code (of 1911) §238 = 28 USC §345 (1946)
= section appears not to have survived the
judicial code revision in 1948

"The words 'judgment' and 'decision' are interchangeable, and
use of word 'decision' in place of word 'judgment' was a defect in
form only...."

Erardi v. Krystofalski, 184 A.2d 676,23 Conn.Sup. 476,
1 Conn.Cir. 324.
"[T]he terms 'judgment'...'decision'...are more or less cognate as
applied in legal proceedings, and closely allied in meaning...A
'judgment' is a final determination of a cause given by any competent
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tribunal...A 'decision' has been defined to be a judgment given by a
competent tribunal." (Underlining added.)

Halbert v. Alford, Tex., 16 S.W. 814, 815.
"It is true that in an abstract sense there is a shade of difference
between the import of the word 'decision' and the word 'judgment'.
"The decision is the resolution of the principles which determine the
controversy: the judgment is the formal paper applying them to the
rights of the parties"

Buckeye Pipe-Line Co. v. Fee, 57 N.E. 446, 447, 62 Ohio St. 543,
78 Am.St.Rep. 743, citing Abb.Law Diet. 351;
Freem.Judgm. § 22; Whart.Law Diet. 235, 437.
"[T]he word 'decision' has the same meaning as the word
'judgment.' A decision of the court is its judgment."

Board of Education of City of Emporia v. State, 52 P. 466, 467,
7 Kan.App. 620.
"The word 'decision' as used in Sess. Laws 1901, c. 8 1 , S 40...means
the same as 'judgment.'"
Gentz's Estate v. Galles, 93 P. 702, 703, 14 N . M . 341, citing

13 Cyc. p. 427; 1 Bouvier (Rawle's Revision) 517.
"The term 'decision' found in section 11578, General Code, is
used in that section in the sense of judgment."

Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Musselli, 130 N.E. 32, 33,
102 Ohio St. 10.
"As used in Code...decision of court...means 'judgment' or 'final
order.'"

State v. Hamilton, 156 N.E.2d 326, 327,107 Ohio App. 37.
"'[D]ecision' meaning a judgment given by a competent tribunal."
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Richards, 204 N.Y.S. 246, 248,123

Misc. 83.
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"A 'decision' is a judgment of a court. Rap. & L. Law Diet."
In re Milford & M. R. R., 36 A. 545, 548, 68 N.H. 570.
" A 'decision' is announcement by court of its judgment."
Hilton v. Hymers, 65 P.2d. 679, 685 57 Nev. 391.
"The 'decision' of a court is its judgment."
Adams v. Yazoo &M. V. R. Co., 24 So. 317, 318, 77 Miss.
194, 60 L.R.A. 33.
In the course of producing this brief (my first and only such assaymen t), I perused scores, perhaps even hundreds, of petitions for
extraordinary writ.

And I cannot recall even a single one which was

directed toward the final judgment of a case (i.e., entreating the
reviewing court to set it aside for insufficiency of the evidence or such.)
Invariably, such petitions were used in an interlocutory fashion and were
directed toward some interim issue in the case.

(Seeking extraordinary

relief because the indictment or information hadn't been properly filed,
or the summons hadn't been properly served, or something like that.)
And although I know there is a rubric which generally mandates (along
with the need to present a dispositive issue) that there is no interlocutory
review if a case is not appealable on final judgment, I very much wonder
if any conflict with § 78-6-10(2) isn't lessened (or even eliminated) by
extraordinary relief so confined.
In this respect I bid the Court's attention to an article, published in
Vol. XVI of the Utah Bar Bulletin, Nos. 8, 9,10 (August-October, 1946), p.
113, and reproduced in its entirety as Appendix "B" in the Addendum,
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entitled "The Use of the Writ of Prohibition in the State of Utah as a Means of
Intermediary Review". Authored by former Utah Supreme Court Justice
James H. Wolfe (do you recollect the Very Most Reverend Justice Wolfe
herebefore cited?), he therein treated most of the Utah cases touching on
prohibition up to that time.
I think what he wrote is most apropos to the present cogitations of the
honorable Court:
" I n 1 8 9 6 , t h e year t h e Constitution of Utah became
operative, our Supreme Court held t h a t article 8 , section 9 of
t h e Constitution, which provides t h a t an appeal shall lie
'from all final j u d g m e n t s of t h e district courts,' w a s a
limitation on t h e power of the Supreme Court to entertain
appeals.

Under this holding the court had no power under

t h e Constitution to entertain any appeals other than final
judgments.* * *
"This holding t h a t t h e Supreme Court had no jurisdiction
to entertain appeals except from final j u d g m e n t s obtained
until 1 9 3 7 , w h e n it w a s expressly overruled in Attorney
General v. Pomeroy, 9 3 Utah 4 2 6 , 7 3 P. ( 2 . d ) 1 2 7 7 .

I t is out

of this background t h a t t h e w r i t of prohibition has evolved
into a limited w r i t of supervisory control and within certain
limits a r e m e d y for intermediate r e v i e w / ' ( p . 1 1 3 ) (Underlining added.)
DON'T YOU GET IT? The Utah Supreme Court at that time felt that
the state Constitution permitted them appellate jurisdiction only over final
judgments.

But that same Constitution granted them unlimited, untram45

meled original jurisdiction over extraordinary writs. So they said to
themselves, "Hmm, if ever we need to exert interim review of some issue
in a case before it reaches final judgment, we'll just use extraordinary
writ process to do it."
Let's again harken to the Very Most Reverend Justice Wolfe's article
in the Utah Bar Bulletin at p. 119, where he goes on to say:
" [ I ] t w a s expressly recognized in t h e opinion in Atwood
v. Cox [88 Utah 437,55 P.2d 377] t h a t t h e w r i t of prohibition
could under certain n a m e d circumstances be used as a
proceeding for an i n t e r m e d i a t e r e v i e w . . . . " (Underlining added.)
Then later in Justice Wolfe's article at p. 120:
" I t also appears t h a t t h e w r i t of prohibition can be used
as an intermediate w r i t of review w h e r e facts w a r r a n t it.
The rule is thus stated in Mayers V. Bronson, 1 0 0 Utah 2 7 9 ,
1 1 4 P.2d 2 1 3 : . . . . "

(Underlining added.)

Then later at p. 124:
" I t thus appears t h a t by t h e cases of A t w o o d v. Cox,
supra, and subsequent cases based upon it, t o g e t h e r w i t h
t h e case of Attorney General v. Pomeroy, supra, t h e
Supreme Court is in position to entertain an intermediary
review either through t h e instrumentality of the w r i t of
prohibition or by direct appeal f r o m an interlocutory ruling
w h e r e t h e exigencies of the situation d e m a n d it.

But t h e

court will not in any case either grant t h e w r i t nor entertain
an appeal f r o m an interlocutory order w h e r e the situation is
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such as will abide the event of final judgment.

I n those

cases where there is both lack or excess of jurisdiction and
the element of irretrievability the court grants the writ or
entertains an appeal. I n other cases the entertainment of
the appeal before final judgment or the issuance of the writ
will be in the discretion of the court, which discretion will
depend on factors dealing with irretrievability, hazard and
public interest and importance." (Underlining added.)
Finally, consider two citations from one of the cases supra (Mayers v.
Bronson at 216 and 217 respectively), and then I'll try to hammer home
the point I've been assaying to make.
(I realize it ain't strictly according to Hoyle to quote the headnotes of a
case report, but...):
"The very purpose of a liberalized right to bring
prohibition is to prevent intermediate appeals where such
appeals would otherwise be the only means of preventing
injustice, and the right to bring such an appeal is not an
'adequate remedy' which bars prohibition." (Underlining
added.)
(Ah, what the Frogs call the cut de grass...):
"The language in Alexander v. United States, 2 0 1 U.S.
117, at page 122, 26 S.Ct. 356, at page 358, 50 L.Ed.686,
where the court refused to entertain an appeal from an
interlocutory order requiring a party to do an act, even
though questionably within the jurisdiction of the lower
court, must be construed as confined to appeals and not
writs of prohibition."
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All right, are ya gettin' it? The language of U.C.A. § 78-6-10(2), must
be strictly construed, and when it says , "THE decision of the trial de novo
may not be appealed", it means the final decision of the case and not some
interim decision. And if some little Wisenheimer thinks to object, "Yeah,
but the standard precept is that if a final decision is not appealable, neither
is any interim decision", that principle is not applicable to prohibition,
as the foregoing citations were meant to show.
AND THE PROOF OF THAT IS, has the Utah Supreme Court ever
issued a writ of prohibition to a justice court in a criminal case, despite the
fact that a determination of the justice court wasn't appealable to the
Supreme Court?

(Nor could there be any review by the Supreme Court,

for that matter, of the district court's subsequent de novo decision of such a
case brought to it.) YES, such an instance is to be found in People v.
Spiers, 4 Utah 385,10 P. 609,11 P. 509. To quote Justice Wolfe again at
p. 123 in his Utah Bar Bulletin article :
"The petitioner t h e r e w a s being tried by a j u s t i c e ' s court
for a crime over which it had no jurisdiction.

The defendant

applied for a w r i t of prohibition which i s s u e d / '
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If I were on the bench, this next proffering would be called a
"dictum".

(Which if respelled and looked at in terms of its benefit to

those encountering it, is probably an apt characterization.)
The honorable Court has sought the assessment of the parties litigant,
in light of U.C.A. § 78-6-10(2), and assuming that extraordinary relief in a
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small claims action is nonetheless available in spite of it, " w h e t h e r ,
and

what,

the

relier 1 .

limits

should

be

placed

on

the

scope

of

In addressing this consideration of limits, I am somewhat

placed in the position of a father expostulating with his adolescent
daughter, "Don't sleep around, but if you're going to...."

Bear in mind

that what I hereafter adduce is prefaced by the caveat, "You really
shouldn't, and if you must..."

And like the Apostle Paul, I voice this only

by way of concession unto you, and not with approval. ("But I speak this
by permission, and not of commandment.

For I would that all men were

even as I myself." l§i Corinthians chap. 7, w . 6 & 7, King James Version.)
Anyway, I say again that I don't like to make any sort of "If you have
get drunk, at least get drunk at home" allowance to you, but if you otherwise
feel compelled to die by your own hand as regards self-imposed
nonintervention for the most part, in small claims cases by extraordinary
writ, at least reserve unto yourselves intermediary review power merely
in regard to the threshold (in limine) issues. Three come to mind
immediately:
1.) Questions of jurisdiction
2.) Questions of proper venue (C.J.A. Rule 4-803, pertaining to
trial de novo in small claims cases, provides under subpart
(B), "Either party may move for a change of venue under the applicable
Rules of Civil Procedure."
3.) Questions of disqualification of a judge
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Having thus ruled, court is dismissed sine die and Justice Panos
leaves the bench.

Conclusion and Precise Relief Sought
For the foregoing reasons, it is clear and unambiguous that (a.) the
fee to the justice court is jurisdictional for perfecting any appeal c/e novo
to the district court, (b.) the Defendant/Real Party in Interest did not pay
the fee within the time allowed for appeal, and (c.) the district court does
not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal per the plain language of the
applicable rules.

Nor can the district court exercise any "equitable

discretion" prior to obtaining jurisdiction of the case, nor do any
circumstances of the case warrant it to do so. Therefore the Court is
prayed to issue its writ of prohibition to the district court, directing that it
cannot assume jurisdiction, and further directing it to enter an order of
dismissal of the cause of the Defendant/Real Party in Interest on appeal.
Further, the Court is obtested to hold that it is endowed with an
inviolate constitutional power to intervene by extraordinary writ
in any juridical issue to which it may choose to direct itself within
this state; that it is an absolute right of every citizen to invoke this
jurisdiction by petitioning the Court for its prerogative discretion;
and that this authority of the Court cannot be constricted by any
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statute, by order or decision of any other tribunal, or even by
self-imposed rule of the Court itself.
Respectfully submitted (and if not apparently so, it is genuinely so),
^.v
l i s " »I ' " " day of November, 2003.
DATED this

Clifton
cnirton W.
w. Panos pro se
Petitioner/Plaintiff

Certificate of Service
Service is constated upon the respective parties' counsels—to each
of them two (2) true and correct replications of the foregoing document
entitled BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON REHEARING—along with two (2)
copies each of the separately bound Addendum thereto—via posting by
the U.S. Mail, with first-class postage and all other fees prepaid, to their
respective addresses as shown on the official U.S. Postal Service
Certificates of Mailing exhibited at Appendix "E" of the Addendum, per
the dates postmarked thereon.
Clifton W. Panos pro se
Petitioner/Plaintiff

Epilogue
v. 10 Then said Paul, I stand at Caesar's judgment seat, where I ought to be
judged: to the Jews have I done no wrong, as thou very well knowest.
v. 11 For if I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I
refuse not to die: but if there be none of these things whereof these accuse me,
no man may deliver me unto them. I appeal unto Caesar.
v. 12 Then Festus, when he had conferred with the council, answered, Hast
thou appealed unto Caesar? unto Caesar shalt thou go.
TheActs of the Apostles, chap. 25 (King James Version)
Had I been acting as counsel to the apostle, I would have advised him to invoke
Caesar's original jurisdiction rather than his appellate jurisdiction and petition for
habeas corpus instead. (I mean heck, they all spoke Latin back then, didn't they?)
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the assistant city attorney and the clerk
If litigants ask for extraordinary writs of the court to accompany both himself and
of prohibition and permit other rights to the petitioner to the courtroom. The judge
expire, they do so at their peril.
then took off his hat and coat, convened
the court, found the petitioner guilty of
PRATT, J., dissenting.
contempt for having made the remark, and
imposed sentence.
13. Action <&=>63

[1] A reference to the applicable statutes and cases in respect to contempts and
procedure for punishing, if committed, will
suffice to dispose of this proceeding. Section 104—45—1, U.C.A., 1943, enumerates
acts and omissions constituting contempt.
The substance of the sections applicable
here are: (1) That disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge
while holding the court tending to interrupt
Edward W. Clyde, of Salt Lake City, for the due course of trial or other judicial
plaintiff.
proceeding are contempts of the authority
Ira A. Huggins, of Ogden, for defend- of the court, and (2) Any other unlawful
ants.
interference with the process or proceedings of the court are likewise contemptuLATIMER, Justice.
ous acts.
Petitioner instituted original proceedThe facts of this proceeding do not bring
ings in this court to prohibit defendant the petitioner under the first quoted subJudge of the City Court of Ogden City, section. Admitting, if necessary, that petiUtah, from enforcing a certain judgment tioner's behavior was contemptuous or inholding petitioner in contempt of court and solent, it was expressed while the judge
sentencing him to a fine or term in jail.
and petitioner were either in the elevator
The facts out of which this controversy or just about to enter it. The judge was
arose are these: Petitioner had appeared not holding court, he had already adjournin the City Court of Ogden City to answer ed the morning session, he was on his way
a criminal charge of disturbing the peace. out of the building, and no trial or other
Defendant judge heard the matter, peti- judicial proceedings were then in progress.
tioner was found guilty, and ordered to pay
[2] There is grave doubt that petitiona fine or in the alternative to serve a jail
er's
conduct was such as to constitute a
sentence. Petitioner then left the courthouse and about one-half hour later re- violation of the second provision of the
turned to the office of the city attorney to statute quoted herein. The rule announcpay the fine. He was directed to go to the ed by the Supreme Court of the United
office of the desk sergeant, which was lo- States and by this court is that criticism
cated on the ground floor of the same after final disposition of an action is the
building. The defendant judge had recess- exercise of the right of free speech and
ed court and was preparing to leave the therefore not contemptuous. See Bridges
building. The judge and petitioner arrived v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 62
at the elevator shaft on the fifth floor of S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346;
the building about the same time, both Kirkham v. Sweetring, 108 Utah 397, 160
waiting for the elevator and as they P.2d 435. In view of our decision on the
stepped on, the petitioner made the fol- other aspect of this case, it is not necessary
lowing statement: ' T h a t is the worst ex- to comment on the contention that the beample of a Kangaroo Court I have ever havior of the petitioner went beyond the
seen." The judge overheard it, took the limits of criticism.
Section 104—45—3, U.C.A., 1943, propetitioner by the arm, escorted him to the

Original proceeding by James Robinson
against the City Court for the City of
Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, and
J. Quill Nebeker, Judge thereof, to prohibit the judge from enforcing a certain
judgment holding the petitioner in contempt of court and sentencing him to a
fine or term in jail.
Alternative writ made permanent.

